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Abstract 
The paper suggests that a different approach to the child should be 
undertaken in the legal system. Children should be viewed as a group who 
hold their own rights separately to those of the adult and should be 
acknowledged as underdeveloped in their logic, reasoning and conclusive 
thinking abilities. If those children were assessed on their own developed 
abilities, it is argued that the correct administration of justice should ensue.  
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Introduction 
It is now understood by academics that the development of the child has 
changed dramatically in the last century.i John Locke was inspirational in his 
evaluation of the child in the beginning of the 1700’s. His theory states that 
the newborn child is a ‘Tabula Rosa’, meaning an empty state. In his paper he 
expresses his theory metaphorically arguing: 
‘[t]he senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty 
cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, 
they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the 
mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the 
use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished 
with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its 
discursive faculty.’ii 
Following on from John Locke, academics of the 1900’s advanced child 
development theory further. For example, Edward Thorndike presented the 
‘Law of Effect’, which became the basis for operant conditioning within 
behaviourism. The ‘Law of Effect’ was based upon the notion that people 
learn by the consequences of their own acts.iii Operant conditioning research 
is described as being ‘prolific’iv and is founded on the basis of voluntary 
behaviours.  ‘The behaviours arise as a result of the way we operate on our 
environment and the rewards or punishments that we experience as a 
consequence.’v Interesting to note is how this can ultimately affect the child in 
the criminal court system. How might the child act to please an adult? Or, how 
may the witness spin a truth to help the prosecution? Operant conditioning 
can teach people and animals to act a certain way within situations, it is 
controversial but could be fundamental in explaining why the administration of 
justice may be affected in cases concerning the child. For example, where the 
single parent asks their young child to put an item in their pocket, in a store, 
without having paid for said item, and is rewarded later with affection. This 
would technically be considered as positive reinforcement of socially immoral, 
and illegal, behaviour. 
Albert Bandura has criticised the behaviourist theories as they neglect 
determinants of man’s behaviour arising from his cognitive functioning.vi The 
theory could undermine this argument as he states that behaviour is not 
based purely on imitating others behaviour but rather analysing different 
behaviours and conceptualising them based on the beliefs and expectations 
of themselves and others.vii The analysis the child completes to assess 
behaviour will be completely dependent upon their environment and 
background (if we follow Bandura’s logic). If said child is surrounded by bad 
influences, as can be said for the defendants in R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Departmentviii can they truly be held accountable for their socially 
accepted actions? Do they truly know right from wrong?  
Whether the child needs to understand right from wrong does not appear to 
be considered in the Convention on the rights of the Child which gave 
children, almost worldwide, their own rights;ix this will be considered in further 
detail later. The recent advances in child development theory have led to 
criticism from the Law Commissionx and many othersxi, as the legal system 
has not implemented a multidisciplinary, rights-based, approach to the child 
defendant, or witness, despite many arguments, discussed later, in favour of 
said approach. It still therefore remains to ask how far can a child be affected 
by and affect the correct administration of justice?  
Children’s Rights 
The definition of the child has been internationally accepted to be the United 
Nations’ meaning in the Convention on the Rights of the Childxii (hereafter 
CRC); this meaning has been ratified by English legislation to the extent of an 
individual under the age of 18. The CRC through implementation created a 
unity amongst the international community, which had never been completed 
previously; all the countries that agreed to the treaty must provide children 
with rights and create rights for children. The difference between providing 
children with rights and creating rights for children can be assessed through 
Articles 3 and 12. Article 3 states that the ‘best interests of the child’ shall be 
considered in all actions concerning children.xiii This creates a right for the 
child that establishes a rule concerning adults considering their (the child’s) 
best interests. Whereas Article 12 gives children their right to freely express 
their opinion, should they be developed enough to form and communicate 
one.xiv It is interesting that the CRC established rights for the child and 
provided rights to the child, as the consequence could be controversial in 
certain situations; for example where the child believes they should have their 
opinion considered yet the adult believes they should not.  
 
‘The statement that a child has a particular right is both an expression 
of an existing social norm that recognises the importance of the content 
of that legal right to the child, as well as a means of changing social 
norms to be more reflective of that importance.’xv 
 
In this instance it could be argued that the social norms, and law in some 
areas, considered later, need more time for tangible, legally based, changes 
to happen.  
 
Lucinda Ferguson argues that there are three types of reasons for children’s 
rights: expressive, procedural and substantive.xvi  Expressive reasoning 
relates to empowering the child to ensure their equal respect; but also 
enfranchises the child to allow them their unique narrative. The second 
argument stems from procedural reasoning that allows children to make their 
own decisions. ‘A rights-based or children’s rights-based approach might 
secure a greater role for competent children in the decision- making process’ 
[and more specifically, within the court system.]xvii If the child defendant or 
witness was allowed to make his or her own decision how far could the 
administration of justice be changed? The correct procedural changes could 
be implemented for said child, making visiting court a less traumatic 
experience; which is something the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Actxviii has failed to do for child witnesses, and it has since failed in 
implementing those standards for the child defendant. The third reason for 
children’s rights is based upon substantive reasoning – it is the standard of 
improvement for the child - in this respect however, it would be aiding the 
child to present the truth so that the correct administration of justice can 
ensue. 
 
The autonomous child 
‘A core dilemma faced by professionals working with children lies in 
recognising their autonomous rights on the one hand, whilst simultaneously 
seeking to ‘safeguard’ or protect them on the other.’xix ‘Autonomy [can be] 
understood as a minimal capacity – basic autonomy - which signifies the 
ability to act independently, authoritatively and responsibly.’xx This is 
something that the child will learn whilst becoming an adult, normally through 
its peers, parents and from society as a whole. Although, there will always be 
on the ‘one extreme… agents who completely lack autonomy, [whilst on] the 
other agents who are fully (or ideally) autonomous; in between are agents 
who exhibit autonomy by different degrees.’xxi It would therefore seem that 
autonomy is not innate, or possibly that the idea of autonomy is the social 
construct used to explain and formalise expectations that those peers, parents 
and society hold. If the child is analysed in a social/psychological context it is 
viewed that the intellectual competence of a child is underdeveloped whilst 
the impact of the care from their parents, and social prerequisites that they 
live by [will them, and they therefore] are interlinked, and consequently cannot 
be seen as autonomous. xxii  
 
Autonomy is highlighted in the case of R v Wilson.xxiii In this case a 13-year-
old boy stated he was ‘swept along’ by the aggression of his father and 
helped him kill another.xxiv ‘This decision was inevitable, but reflects badly on 
English criminal law.’xxv The problem with the decision is that an autonomous 
13-year-old boy, who is still developing logic and reasoning skills, is under 
duress to kill, and lacks intent, but is still prosecuted. The Law Commission 
can be considered to agree with this logic as they stated on the matter:  
 
‘capacity to withstand duress is increased with maturity and it would be unjust 
to expect the same level of maturity from a twelve-year-old as from an adult… 
a ten-year-old whose moral character is not fully formed should not be 
expected in all the circumstances to resist the temptation to kill in order to 
avert a threat to himself.’xxvi 
 
The Court of Appeal did note in their decision ‘the reality is that, on our law as 
it stands, the appellant did not have a defence’ and furthermore that:  
 
‘there may be grounds for criticising a principle of law that does not afford a 
13-year-old boy any defence to a charge of murder on the ground that he was 
complying with his father's instructions, which he was too frightened to refuse 
to disobey.’xxvii  
 
The above case highlights ‘[t]he fallacy that legal values describe physical 
reality… [put] very simply, the law treats man’s conduct as autonomous and 
willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it 
were.’xxviii This can automatically create an injustice to the child defendant, or 
even the child witness or victim. It is desirable to the law because:  
 
‘the capacity of the individual human being to live his life in reasonable 
freedom [from social constraints] would be impaired unless the law provided a 
locus poenitentiae… [a place of repentance] beyond which external 
constraints may be imposed, but before which the individual is free…of the 
very specific constraints of the law.’xxix  
 
Maybe with judicial discretion, the Law Commissions recent reports and the 
added support of many for raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
(hereafter MACR) we could start seeing tangible changes to the rights based 
approach the CRC identified.  
 
Consent and the minimum age of criminal responsibility  
For autonomy to be fulfilled by an individual, they must also have the capacity 
to understand and make their own decisions. ‘Hart argues that there is a 
minimum mental and physical capacity a person must possess if they are to 
be subjected to criminal liability, which he called ‘capacity responsibility’’.xxx 
The concept is also contained within the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. As Rule 4.1 states the age for 
criminal responsibility ‘shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in 
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.’xxxi The UK 
government must adhere to the rule, though because no age limit is directly 
set it can be argued that they already are adhering. Many other 
recommendations to raise the MACR have been received including the 
following: the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies,xxxii the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child’s Committee,xxxiii the Centre for the 
Prison Reform Trust,xxxiv Barnardos, xxxv the Royal Society,xxxvi the Child 
Rights International Network,xxxvii and the Centre for Social Justicexxxviii − there 
does not appear to be any political will to act on them.xxxix The Government 
has repeatedly stated that it has no intention to raise the MACRxl though 
Scotland has raised their MACR to 12xli and Northern Ireland have consulted 
on raising theirs to 12, with the potential to raise it to 14.xlii Without the 
government making changes to the MACR children will continue to be 
prosecuted without any real logical reasoning. By real it is not argued that the 
law is not reality, it is argued that a law lacking clear logical reasoning should 
not be supported by politicians or the judiciary.  
In England, ‘[c]hildren below the age of 10 are considered to be incapable of 
committing crime as they are deemed unable to form the requisite mens 
rea.’xliii Conversely, the disciplines of sociology and psychology theorise that 
children are not developed enough to be reprimanded for crimes at age 10. 
Jean Piaget was fundamental in understanding child development.xliv He 
conceptualised clear stages of development as: ‘sensorimotor’, 
‘preoperational’, ‘concrete operational’ and ‘formal operational’. The latter 
stages, concrete operational and formal operational, develop between the 
ages of 7-16 and are deemed to develop the area of logical thought and the 
beginnings of abstract reasoning which can help with consequential thinking 
and judgment.xlv Jean Piaget’s theory was also criticised as some have stated 
that not every person makes it to the formal operation stage.xlvi Although the 
Government are unwilling to raise the age of criminal responsibility it seems 
clear that the European Union, although not always agreeing to a raise in the 
MACRxlvii, may have changed their mind as the Commissioner for Human 
Rights stated that:  
‘[he has] extreme difficulty in accepting that a child of 12 or 13 can be 
criminally culpable for his actions, in the same sense as an adult. [He does] 
not mean to deny that extreme measures may need to be taken, both to 
punish the act and to attempt to correct whatever it is that has clearly gone so 
drastically wrong.’xlviii  
The view taken by the Commissioner is similar to the restorative justice that 
the UK government reported in its note on the MACR. Their note states:  
‘We are now seriously considering widening the delivery of restorative justice 
and giving the police their own restorative justice interventions for the lower 
level of offences, which could be recorded for their own purposes. That is in 
addition to making sure that people both make restoration and receive 
punishment— the two are not alternatives—in the rest of the criminal justice 
system.’xlix 
Restorative justice should be used for all, as well as punishment dependent 
upon severity of the crime committed, between the ages of 10 and 18. English 
legislation is curious in relation to decision making for children between these 
ages. The Mental Capacity Actl states that a person will have capacity unless 
otherwise proven, and section 2 states that a lack of capacity cannot be 
proven merely by reference to age.li Therefore meaning one has the capacity 
to make decisions. If an individual becomes involved with the Mental Health 
Actlii the act will apply to any person at any age. Agreeably, Parents have 
control over all persons under the age of 18liii, yet, one can be married legally, 
with parental consent, at the age of 16, without it is at the age of 18.liv A child 
is viewed as competent and capacitated, when under the age of 16, if they 
can understand the facts for making decisions in respect of healthcare. This 
principle was derived from Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health 
Authority.lv Lord Scarman’s ratio decidendi was of particular interest as he 
stated that:  
 
‘[t]he principle of the law… is that parental rights are derived from parental 
duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of the person 
and property of the child. The principle has been subjected to certain age 
limits set by statute for certain purposes: and in some cases the courts have 
declared an age of discretion at which a child acquires before the age of 
majority the right to make his (or her) own decision.’lvi lvii  
 
Emma Cave notes an interesting point regarding Gillicklviii. She states that 
defects in the individual’s ability to control her desires or actions, reasoning 
abilities, the information available to her, and in the stability of the individual’s 
own desires, can impede her [the child’s] autonomy.lix The problem with 
Cave’s analysis is that it tends to create a circular argument: if the child 
cannot understand then they do not have the adequate capacity to make the 
choice, and if they do not have capacity then they do not have autonomy, if 
they do not have the autonomy then they are not in a position to engage with 
their rights as a child. This would lead to a child not being criminally culpable 
when breaking the law, or a child witness not being able to stand as a witness 
simply because they are children.  
 
If in some cases the child can be considered to make their own decision, 
surely a new defence to replace doli incapax should be used as a defence for 
children. It is argued that the child does not have the typical defences 
available, however, where the child is provided specific rights, and changes 
are made to the trial procedure for said child should there not also be a 
defence available for those who are not as developed as their peers? This 
was a view taken by the Law Commission. The only defences, which currently 
could be used for the child’s lack of development, are fitness to plead and 
diminished responsibility. Fitness to plead could be used by the child but it is 
based around the notion of comprehension and is not sympathetic to the 
child. The test was founded in R v Pritchardlx and applies to any person who 
has ‘insufficient intellect to instruct his solicitors and counsel, to plead to the 
indictment, to challenge jurors, to understand the evidence, and to give 
evidence.’lxi Moreover, the defence of diminished responsibility does not 
include ‘developmental immaturity’.lxii Developmental immaturity would seem 
to be flexibility within the law that allows for children who have not developed 
at the same rate as their peers,lxiii it could be said that this would be similar to 
the ‘reasonable man’ standard.  The Law Commission concluded that ‘there is 
an imperative need for a review of the law of homicide in relation to child and 
young person defendants.’lxiv Dr Eileen Vizard has stated that there must be 
an appreciation that the child’s competence cannot be assessed without 
reference to the child’s developmental status, mental state, family and 
environment. lxv The Law Commission have also accepted that a balance 
must be undertaken in respect of assessing children based on a rights, 
decision making position and assessing them in terms of their ability to 
comprehend right from wrong.lxvi The unanswered question that the Law 
Commission and Dr Vizard create is whether defences would be needed if the 
child were to be assessed? If there was an assessment undertaken of said 
child defendant, or witness, which culminated in a report stating the child does 
not have adequate mental capacity to form the mens rea of the offence surely 
there would be little need for a defence? 
 
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and the child witness 
It is pertinent at this point to note the recent legislation that has been 
introduced to aid the child within the court system. The Youth Justice Criminal 
Evidence Act section (hereafter YJCEA and S) 16 states that ‘a witness in 
criminal proceedings (other than the accused) is eligible for assistance … if 
under the age of 17 at the time of hearing.’lxvii The assistance established is 
that of the special measures directions which will be analysed later. The main 
provisions regarding witness competence are sections 53-57. The sections 
state there is a clear presumption of competence for all witnesses exempting 
only those incapable of making themselves understood;lxviii the onus of 
proving competence is placed upon the party calling the witness, and the 
hearing of competence is established without the jury present.lxix If a witness 
is not sworn, but should have been (any one over the age of 14) then there 
will be a challenge to the conviction.lxx The judge will also have to admonish 
the witness, as endorsed by Judge Auld in Hampshire:lxxi ’Tell us all you can 
remember of what happened. Don’t make anything up or leave anything out. 
This is very important.’lxxii Furthermore, perjury will be committed if you were 
lawfully sworn, if you were sworn when you should not have been, then 
perjury cannot be committed.lxxiii The main contentious point is that Children’s 
competence in court cannot be assessed without reference to the child’s 
developmental status, mental state and family/environment.lxxivThis could lead 
to an injustice being committed. 
 
The special measures directions (hereafter SMD), mentioned earlier, were 
implemented to help children give the best evidence they can in court. lxxv 
They are ruled on at the beginning of a trial if there are vulnerable witnesses 
involved. There are eight SMD’s set out in the YJCEA between S23-30. The 
main ones I shall examine are: evidence by live link,lxxvi video recorded 
examination and cross examinationlxxvii and examination through 
intermediary.lxxviii Firstly, evidence by live link is available by ruling of a SMD. 
The child also ‘may not give evidence in any other way’lxxix if specified by the 
court, though in practice all children now give evidence this way.lxxx  In R v 
Redbridge Youth Court Latham LJ stated that ‘the impact of evidence given 
directly to the court is likely to be greater whether it be in favour of the 
prosecution or the defence.’lxxxiThis is Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) compliant, however, it is ‘unfortunate that in 
formulating an implicit ‘equality of arms’ rationale, Latham LJ subscribed to 
the common but untested perception amongst English barristers that evidence 
on video link is less persuasive for jurors’.lxxxii It is contrary to the main 
requirement that quality of their evidence will be improved.lxxxiii A potential 
problem with the live link is that a witness should be seen by judge, jury, legal 
representatives, and anyone helping the witness. If they cannot be seen, it 
can contravene Article 6, ECHR as the defendant will have been deprived of 
the right to participate effectively in their trial. Another criticism regarding the 
live link is that the YJCEA is completely silent as to who can sit in the room 
with the witness. It is usually a court usher, though, it could be detrimental in 
allowing the best evidence the witness can give. The point of the live link is to 
alleviate as much anxiety as possible. Should there be guidance published on 
the role? It was recommended that ‘the Lord Chief Justice review the existing 
guidelines on the identity of the support person.’lxxxiv If the person in the room 
was someone the child knew well such as a parent, the child could feel 
constrained about any changes to the account that ought to be made. lxxxv 
  
The Pigot Report was the first to establish a need for video evidence. It states  
‘almost all of those who submitted evidence to us believed that the existing 
law is far too restrictive and that some general provision ought now to be 
made for video recorded evidence to be admissible,’lxxxvi today this is provided 
for in the YJCEA. It has been met with some criticism, at first, specifically 
regarding when new information comes to light in a trial, or when there is a 
need to re-examine a witness. However, the YJCEA allows for this:  
 
‘that the proposed cross-examination is sought by a party to the proceedings 
as a result of that party having become aware, since the time when the 
original recording was made in pursuance of subsection (1), of a matter which 
that party could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained by then’ or in 
the course of justice.lxxxvii  
 
‘The risk that any inconsistencies between statements made in the two 
recordings would have to be cross-examined on separately, were glossed 
over by government spokesmen in Parliament.’lxxxviii The defendant must also 
be able to see and hear the examination and to communicate with his lawyer 
whilst the judge and advocates must be able to see and hear the examination 
of the witness and to communicate with the persons in whose presence the 
recording is being made. Furthermore, a concern is that the defence will be 
partial as they will have to cross examine in advance of the trial, without 
hearing any other witnesses examinations. Defence advocates could also feel 
disadvantaged as a jury will not be present, and, rightly or wrongly, they can 
generally take a feel to how evidence is sitting with them. A change of a last 
minute plea to guilty will not save the prosecution witness from having to go 
through examination,lxxxix causing more stress for the child. 
 
The third significant point is that relating to the examination through an 
intermediary. It has been held by the European Commission that S29xc would 
not contravene Art 6 (Baegen v Netherlands.xci). S29 (2) goes further than just 
reiterating questions and answers, but instead explains questions and 
answers between the court room and witness so that both can be understood. 
The reiteration of any question would need to be told to the court, however 
illogical or irrational it may be, without which, a defendant could argue the trial 
was unfairly conducted and an injustice was done.xcii  It is therefore obvious; 
an intermediary would need to be competent, impartial, and fully independent. 
It could create an issue with the child, if they are unwilling to speak through a 
stranger, or for the intermediary understanding the child may be quite hard. If 
a situation did occur where the only individual able to act as an intermediary 
was someone the child knew, then a registered intermediary would have to 
act on their behalf to evaluate the witness’ capacity. More practical problems 
also arise, as if the witness speaks with the police as part of their investigation 
of the defendant, the police would need to pre-guess whether the court would 
use an intermediary. The court would then have to be satisfied that the correct 
intermediary was used to access the best evidence - as well as the person 
being completely independent, otherwise the testimony will be contaminated 
and a challenge to the conviction under Art 6 may become available. xciii  
 
Concluding statements 
The CRC was implemented to improve children’s rights and provide children 
rights. The rights have aided the child, they have given the child the option to 
participate in decision making processes (whether they are acknowledged or 
not) and this ultimately should affect the administration of justice in a positive 
way.xciv The other argument to this is that the child, dependent upon age, is 
still developing, how much power, and ultimately responsibility, should they 
have? It is a balancing act that should be undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis. The process would slow down trials, but raising the MACR would 
manage the amount of cases potentially going to trial.  
 
There is quite obviously a new defence needed to replace the loss of doli 
incapax, potentially one of ‘developmental immaturity,’xcv although that was to 
be used only when the crime of murder had been committed. ‘Developmental 
immaturity’xcvi, unfortunately does not go far enough to support the child. It 
would only be available for those who are not as developed as their peers. If 
the MACR was raised there would be less need for defences such as this. In 
respect of the SMD’s mentioned above, it is argued that the same should be 
done for the child defendant, and that the child should be seen as a child no 
matter whether victim, witness or defendant. The Coroner and Justice Actxcvii 
created a new provision of intermediary’s for child defendants – but does this 
really meet the expectation which is thwarted in respect of child development 
and does it really aid the child in the court system?  
 
The criminal law system needs a rights-based approach to the child which is 
infavour of who the child is and not just what they have done.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Books:  
1. Hart HLA, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1968) 
2. Packer HL, The limits of the criminal sanction (Stanford university 
press 1968) 
3. Williams GL, The Criminal Responsibility of Children [1954] Criminal 
Law Review 493 
 
Cases:  
1. Rex v Pritchard [1886] 173 England Reports 135 
2. R v Robertson [1968] 52 Criminal Appeal Reports 690 
3. V and T v UK [2000] 30 European Human Rights Reports 121 
4. Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority [1984] Appeals 
Court 112 
5. R v Wilson [2007] England and Wales Court Appeals (Criminal 
division) 1251 
6. R v Hampshire [1996] Queens Bench division 1 
7. Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council v Simmonds 
[1996] 3 Family division 246 
8. R v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] House of Lords 4 
9. R (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Redbridge Youth Court [2001] 
High Court (Admin) 209 
 
European Cases:  
1. Case C 16696/90 Baegen v Netherlands [1995] 
 
Legislation:  
1. Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
2. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
3. The Mental Health Act 1983 and 2007 
4. Children Act 1989 
5. Coroner and Justice Act 2009 
 
EU Legislation:  
1. The European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
 
Reports:  
1. Pigot, the report on the advisory group on video evidence 1987 
2. Farrington, D.P. & West, D Criminal, penal and life histories of chronic 
offenders: Risk and Protective factors and early identification. Criminal 
Behaviour and Mental Health [1993] 
3. Decisions and Reports of the Commission CommDH (2005) 6 
4. Viv Ashley, Philosophical models of Personal Autonomy [2012] The 
Essex Autonomy Project Green Paper Technical Report 
 
UN Convention:  
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Human Rights 
1990 
2. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice 1985 
 
Journal articles:  
1. Elliott C, ‘Criminal Responsibility and children: a new defence required 
to acknowledge the absence of capacity and choice’ [2011] Journal of 
Criminal Law 
2. Hoyano LCH, ‘Striking a balance between the rights of defendants and 
vulnerable witnesses: will special measures directions contravene 
guarantees of a fair trial?’ [2001] Criminal Law Review  
3. McEwan J, ‘In defence of vulnerable witnesses: the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999’ [2000] International journal of Evidence 
and Proof 
4. Hollingsworth K, ‘Theorising Children’s Rights in Youth Justice: The 
Significance of Autonomy and Foundation Rights’ [2013] Modern Law 
Review 1046 
5. Ferguson L, ‘Not merely rights for children but children’s rights: The 
theory gap and the assumption of the importance of children’s rights’ 
[2013] International Journal of Children’s rights. 
6. Purvis A, ‘Doli Incapax: the culpability of children in criminal law 
Journal of criminal law’ [2009] Journal of Criminal law 136 
7. Ashworth A, ‘Murder: defence – young defendant – intention to kill - 
defendant's father instructing him to assist in murder’, [2008] Criminal 
Law Review 138 
8. Cave E, ‘Maximisation of minors capacities’ [2011] Child and Family 
Law Quarterly  431 
9. Buss E, ‘What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research’ [2009] Hofstra Law Review  Vol 38:13 
 
Seminar Series 
1. Vizard E, ‘POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the 
law’ (2012) University of Exeter 
 
  
Law Commission reports 
1. Law Commission, Partial defences to murder (Law Comm 2004) 
2. Law Commission, ‘A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?’ 
(LCCP 177 2005)  
 
 																																																								
i
 For example see the works of: I Pavlov, The Experimental Psychology and Psychopathology 
of Animals (1903) and BF Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, (Pelican Books 1971) 
ii
 J Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) Ch 1, para 15 
iii
 EL Thorndike, Animal Intellegence: an experimental study of the associative processes in 
animals (1898) 
iv
 W Vialle, I Verenikina, Handbook on Child Development, ( Cengage Learning Australia , 
2000) 8 
v
 IBID 8 
vi
 A Bandura, Social learning theory, (General Learning Corporation 1971) 2 
vii
 IBID 
viii
 [1996] 2 WLR 67 
ix
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Human Rights 1990 
x
 Law Commission, Partial defences to murder (Law Comm 2004) para 3.134 
xi
 See points 17-23 
xii
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Human Rights 1990 
xiii
 IBID, Article 3 para 1 
xiv
 IBID, Article 12 para 1 
xv
 Lucinda Ferguson, ‘Not merely rights for children but children’s rights: The theory gap and 
the assumption of the importance of children’s rights’ [2013] International Journal of 
Children’s rights 21, page 28 
xvi
 IBID 27 
xvii
 IBID 32 
xviii
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
xix
 E Vizard, POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the law (University of 
Exeter 2012) 
xx
 V Ashley ‘Philosophical models of Personal Autonomy’ [2012] The Essex Autonomy Project 
Green Paper Technical Report, 1 Page 5 
xxi
 IBID  5 
xxii
 C Elliott, ‘Criminal Responsibility and children: a new defence required to acknowledge the 
absence of capacity and choice’ [2011] Journal of Criminal law 289  297 
xxiii
 R v Wilson [2007] EWCA Crim 1251 
xxiv
 IBID 
xxv
 Andrew Ashworth ‘Murder: defence – young defendant – intention to kill - defendant's 
father instructing him to assist in murder’ [2008] Criminal Law Review 138  139 
xxvi
 Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (LCCP 177 2005) Para 
7.72 
xxvii
 R v Wilson [2007] England and Wales Court of Appeal Criminal division 125, page 420 
xxviii
 HL Packer, The limits of the criminal sanction, (Stanford university press 1968)  74 
xxix
 IBID  75 
xxx
 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Clarendon 
Press  1968); C Elliott ‘Criminal Responsibility and children: a new defence required to 
acknowledge the absence of capacity and choice’ [2011] Journal of Criminal law 289  294 
xxxi
 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 
xxxii
 2006 
xxxiii
 2002 and 2007 
xxxiv
 2009 
xxxv
 2010 
xxxvi
 2011 
xxxvii
 2012 
xxxviii
 2012 
																																																																																																																																																														
xxxix
 E  Vizard, ‘POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the law’ [2012] University 
of Exeter 
xl
 See for example HL Deb 20 December 2010 c 815-7, HC Deb 20 July 2011 c 1107-8W and 
HC Deb 11 August 2011 c 1086 
xli
 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, S52 
xlii
 Department of Justice, A Review of the Youth Justice System in Northern Ireland, 2011, 
section 5.6 
xliii
 Amy Purvis, ‘Doli Incapax: the culpability of children in criminal law’ [2009] Journal of 
Criminal law 136  137 
xliv
 See for example, Jean Piaget’s theories on child development, ‘The Moral Judgement of 
the Child’ (1932), ‘Origins of Intelligence in the Child’ (1936), ‘Play, Dreams and Imitation in 
Childhood’ (1945) 
xlv
 E  Vizard, ‘POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the law’ [2012] University 
of Exeter 
xlvi
 See for example the books of P Dasen Culture and cognitive development from a 
Piagetian perspective (Allyn and Bacon 1994) and D Keating Handbook of Adolescent 
psychology (Jon Wiley and Sons Inc 2004) 
xlvii
 it was noted in V and T v UK [2000] 30 EHRR 121, that ‘[a]lthough in most of the Member 
States criminal responsibility would not be attributed to a child of 10, there is no common 
approach to the attribution of criminal responsibility.’ 
xlviii
 Decisions and Reports of the Commission CommDH (2005) 6 
xlix
 The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales, Standard Note [2012] 
l
 [2005] 
li
 IBID, S2 (3)(a) 
lii
 Mental Health Act 1983 and 2007 
liii
 Children Act 1989, Section 1 
liv
 Marriage Act 1949 S3 
lv
 [1984] AC 112 
lvi
 IBID 184 
lvii
 IBID 184 
lviii
 IBID 
lix
 E Cave, ‘Maximisation of minors capacities’ [2011] Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 23, 
No 4, 431  434 
lx
 Rex v Pritchard [1886] 173 ER 135 
lxi
 R v Robertson [1968] 52 Cr App R 690 
lxii
 Law Commission, Partial defences to murder (Law Comm 2004) para 3.134 
lxiii
 IBID 
lxiv
 IBID 
lxv
 E  Vizard, ‘POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the law’ (2012) University 
of Exeter 
lxvi
 Law Commission, Partial defences to murder (Law Comm 2004) para 3.133 
lxvii
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 16(1)(a) 
lxviii
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 53 
lxix
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 54 
lxx
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 54 
lxxi
 R v Hampshire [1996] QB 1 
lxxii
 IBID 
lxxiii
 Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council v Simmonds [1996] 3 Fam Cr 
246 
lxxiv
 E  Vizard, ‘POST/ESRC seminar on Neuroscience, children and the law’ (2012) University 
of Exeter 
lxxv
 R v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] UKHL 4 
lxxvi
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 S 24 
lxxvii
 IBID s 28 
lxxviii
 IBID s 29 
lxxix
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 S 24 (2) 
lxxx
 Laura C.H. Hoyano, ‘Striking a balance between the rights of defendants and vulnerable 
witnesses: will special measures directions contravene guarantees of a fair trial?’ 2001 
Criminal Law Review 964, page 949 
																																																																																																																																																														
lxxxi
 R (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Redbridge Youth Court [2001] EWHC 209 
lxxxii
 LCH Hoyano, ‘Striking a balance between the rights of defendants and vulnerable 
witnesses: will special measures directions contravene guarantees of a fair trial?’ 2001 Crim 
LR 962, page 963 
lxxxiii
 J McEwan, ‘In defence of vulnerable witnesses: the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999’ 2000 International journal of evidence and proof 1, 6 
lxxxiv
 IBID 6 
lxxxv
 IBID 6 
lxxxvi
 Pigot, the report on the advisory group on video evidence 1987 para 2.9 
lxxxvii
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 S 28 (6)(a)(b) 
lxxxviii
 J McEwan, ‘In defence of vulnerable witnesses: the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999’ [2000] International journal of evidence and proof 1, 9 
lxxxix
 IBID 10 
xc
 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s 29 
xci
 Case C 16696/90 Baegen v Netherlands [1995] 
xcii
 Article 6, European convention on Human rights 1950 
xciii
 LCH Hoyano, ‘Striking a balance between the rights of defendants and vulnerable 
witnesses: will special measures directions contravene guarantees of a fair trial?’ 2001 
Criminal Law Review 948, 966 
xciv
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Human Rights 1990 
xcv
 Law Commission, Partial defences to murder (Law Comm 2004) para 3.134 
xcvi
 IBID 
xcvii
 2009 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
